Nutzungsbedingungen
The persistence of the Spanish unemployment spurred, in 1984, the implementation of a major reform package to enhance labour market flexibility and to help entrance to the labour market 1 . One of the most labour market innovations was the modification of temporary contracts that allow firms to hire employees performing regular activities. Before this, permanent work contracts represented 90% of all contracts, with the remaining temporary contracts being mainly of seasonal nature. These contracts became attractive to employers because of both, their short duration and low severance payment. Consequently, from these greater incentives, the new temporary contracts immediately enjoyed a degree of success that far exceeded expectations.
The difference in severance payments between temporary and permanent contracts is a key for understanding its success (see Dolado et al, 2002) . The number of temporary contracts was disproportional after the reform of 1984 . In 1994 , 1997 and 2001 took place new reforms, trying to achieve a more balanced situation by restricting the use of temporary contracts and by reducing mandatory firing costs under new permanent contracts. Afterwards, these reforms were not effective to reduce the rate of temporality that still remains around the level of 30%.
1 For a deeply analysis of the legal framework of Spanish' temporary employment growth see Amuedo-Dorantes (2001) ; Dolado et al (2002) and Segura (2001) . This evidence is explained by the negative effect over the worker's effort caused by differences in wages. In addition, Diaz and Sánchez (2004) obtain, through a stochastic frontier analysis, that the high percentage of temporary contracts has affected negatively productivity. Thurow's (1975) model of job competition assumes that productivity is associated to jobs, not to workers. There are jobs with higher productivity than others, and firms allocate workers to jobs according to their educational profile. As employers rarely have direct evidence of the specific training costs for specific workers, they end up by ranking workers according to their educational attainment. In this sense, if job productivity is related with jobs as well as workers, in Spain the high augment of "bad jobs" could explain the negative effects in productivity. Also, Rodríguez-Gutierrez (2006) identifies the main determinants of the proportion of temporary workers at firms and show that this proportion has a countercyclical behaviour.
We built a balanced panel of 1267 workers from 16 to 65 years old to estimate a random effect probit model to analyse the determinants of the temporality in Spain. We obtain that temporality increases for employees younger than 46 years old. Given that temporality affects, over all, people younger than 46 years old we estimate separately two balanced panel of individuals, one for people younger of 46 and other for people older than 45 years old. We have found significant differences between those groups in gender, in education and in sectors F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 of activity. To be a woman younger than 46 reduces the probability of temporality. This result is related with the sample selection imposed to obtain a group of people that works six years without any unemployment spell. It is more difficult for women than for men to persist in employment given the women's higher unemployment rate. Therefore, we can say that the young women of our sample have strongly succeeded in the labour market. Other interesting result is that young people with university level of education increases the probability of temporality. As we will show later, this result could be explained by the fact that during this period most new contracts were temporal. This new contract framework has affected young workers that face different labour market legislation than that found by people who arrived to the labour market before 1984. Firstly, because they faced a labour market with a job creation focused mainly in temporary contracts and secondly, because the labour market reform of 1997 introduced a new permanent contract with lower firing cost and one of the target groups were workers older than 45 years old. Therefore, it explains our findings that workers under 45 have a higher incidence of temporary work. The Spanish legal framework, after the labour market reforms, have developed a broad set of rules promoting permanent contracts as, for example, the existence of legal restriction to the excessive renewing of temporary contracts for the same workers, and some economic incentives to convert temporary contracts in permanent ones.
Even though the existence of a legal constraint 2 , in our sample, the average number of years with the same employer for temporary workers exceed the three 2 It is not allowed to renew a temporary contract to the same worker after three years.
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Gender:
Women: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is a woman and 0 if it is a man.
Marriage:
Married: This variable takes value 1 if the individual is married and 0 otherwise.
Income:
(2004) for a good theoretical framework about gender discrimination and intergenerational Here we will analyse the results obtained by the estimation of three samples. Firstly, we will explain the results of the whole sample (Table 2) , and secondly, we will make a sample selection to analyse separately the results obtained for individuals younger than 46 and older than 45 years old ( Table 3 ).
The tables with the results of the estimated coefficients appear in the Appendix.
The variables used for estimation have been described in section 2.
The whole sample
We have estimated a balanced random effect Probit model to study the determinants of temporary contracts. In Table 2 of Appendix, we present the results. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual has a temporary contract, zero if the contract is permanent.
The age is a variable that affects the probability of been temporal. To be younger than 46 years old increases this probability with respect to be older.
There are not significant differences between men and women in temporality.
In addition, to be married reduces the probability of temporality with respect other situations as single or divorced.
As higher is the monthly net wage, smaller is the probability of temporality. Even though we have a significant coefficient, the impact of this variable is very small because its value vanishes to zero.
To belong to a firm with more than 500 workers reduces the probability of temporality with respect to a firm from 101 to 499 workers. Therefore, in Spain, in the last twenty years, the most part of job creation have been oriented to "bad" jobs. Consequently, the Spanish productivity has been one of the lowest of the European Union.
To work in sectors as chemical products, metallurgy, construction, hotels and transportation increases the probability of temporality with respect the financial management sector; while to work in sectors as real states activities, textile and clothing, fishing and agriculture or education do not present significant differences with respect to work in the financial management sector.
We have obtained significant differences before and after the reform of 1997. The probability of temporality augment in 1995 compared with 1997, which is the year of the second labour market reform and is the category of reference.
However, we do not found significant differences between the year 1998 and 1997, while in the years 1999 and 2000 the probability of temporality decreases with respect 1997. Table 3 .
As we have mentioned previously, temporality affects essentially young people. We have obtained that the probability of temporality, for younger than 25, is larger than for workers older than 24 years old.
When the sample is restricted to individuals younger than 46 to be women reduce the probability of been in a temporary contract. In Spain to persist in a job is difficult for women. So, in this selection we have the most qualified women as we have analysed in previous section. In fact, the percentage of university studies is higher for women than for men. In addition, we have to remark that since 1994
there have been some fiscal incentives to promote the transition of temporary to permanent people for some population groups and females being among these.
As higher is the monthly net wage lesser is the probability of temporality.
This result is related with the Spanish labour market segmentation between "good" and "bad" jobs. In fact, one third of workers are under very flexible employment contracts with low wages and low severance payment and two-thirds are under permanent employment contracts with high wages and very high employment protection.
For individuals with university degree the probability of been temporal is higher than for people with primary education, for the sample of younger than 46 years old. Casquel and Cunyat (2004) have developed a matching model built on (2002) and Wasmer (1999) . They have obtained, that for some type of workers "high productivity workers" temporary jobs act as stepping stones to permanent jobs, whereas other type of workers "low productivity workers" get stuck in temporary jobs. However, we have obtained, in a framework of stables workers, that people with university education get stuck in temporality. Even more, the percentage of conversion from temporary to permanent contracts is higher for workers with other levels of education below to that of university.
As we have mentioned in previous sections, after 1994, the new jobs' creation were essentially temporal. This restriction, have forced young individuals to start in the labour market with a temporary contract. The young people are more educated than older, usually with permanent contract because they came from other type of labour market regulation. In this context firms could choose the best workers from a pool of workers than exceed firm's labour demand. This type of policy has generated serious consequences on productivity, and, consequently, has reduced incentives for education in the long run.
The probability of temporality increases for jobs that belong to the industrial sectors of Fishing and Agriculture, Chemical products, Building and Hotels with respect to the management sector, for both samples. However only for the sample of workers younger than 46 to work in sectors as Food and drinking, Metallurgy, manufacturing and Government augment the probability of temporality with respect the management sector. The reform of 1997 has reduced the share of temporary jobs in private sector, but such a reduction was partially Finally, when we analyse the effect of the labour market reform of 1997 we observe that it was effective in the sample of younger than 46 while for people older than 45 years old there are not significant differences. This result reinforce our previous idea that young workers were the more affected by the change in labour market regulation. They were the most damaged by the use and abuse of temporary contracts and after the 1997 labour market' reform, they have been benefited by the restriction imposed by law and, overall, by the introduction of a new permanent contract. In any case, the reduction in temporality measured around 2 or 3% has questioned the efficacy of these labour market reforms. We have to point out that the temporality rate in Spain in 2006 is still around the 30%.
This result together with that obtained for the sectors of activity, show the segmentation of the Spanish labour market.
Concluding remarks
Temporary contracts have been used in Spain as a way to enter in the labour market. Therefore, as the old permanent contracts coexist together with those temporary modified after the reform of 1984, we have found that older and less educated individuals are more probable to have a permanent contract than young people, which are on average more educated. From a panel of working people with an age ranged from 16 to 65 years old, the gender does not affect to the probability of been temporal. However when we restrict the sample to individuals younger than 46 years old, to be women reduces the probability of temporality with respect to be men. Our selection implies a sample of young workers that are employed during six years without interruption. In Spain to persist in a job is difficult for women. So in this selection we have the most qualified women. In fact the percentage of university studies is higher for young women than for young men. In this sense we could conclude that is more difficult for Spanish women to obtain a job and also to keep it, than to obtain a permanent contract.
We have shown that the probability of temporality in Government increases with respect to the financial management sector for young people. After the 1997 labour market reform the temporality share augments in the public sector. This policy affects mostly the new entrants in the labour market that were predominantly young people.
Our results have shown that temporary contracts have been used in Spain for jobs and in sectors where the long run relations were important to enhance productivity. Now we need a more balanced situation to avoid the disincentives of a high rate of temporality in young entrants in the labour market. Note: the coefficient with * are significant at one percent, those with ** are significant at five percent. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
